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The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a 
goal embedded in the ILO Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 
and
1 which has now been widely adopted by the international community. 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach the goal, the ILO 
pursues  a  Decent  Work  Agenda  which  comprises  four  interrelated  areas:  Respect  for 
fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, employment promotion, 
social protection and social dialogue. Explanations of this integrated approach and related 
challenges  are  contained  in  a  number  of  key  documents:  in  those  explaining  and 
elaborating  the concept  of  decent  work
2,  in  the  Employment  Policy  Convention,  1964 
(No. 122), and in the Global Employment Agenda. 
The  Global  Employment  Agenda  was  developed  by  the  ILO  through  tripartite 
consensus of its Governing Body’s Employment and Social Policy Committee. Since its 
adoption in 2003 it has been further articulated and made more operational and today it 
constitutes the basic framework through which the ILO pursues the objective of placing 
employment at the centre of economic and social policies.
3 
The  Employment  Sector  is  fully  engaged  in  the  implementation  of  the  Global 
Employment  Agenda,  and  is  doing  so  through  a  large  range  of  technical  support  and 
capacity building activities, advisory services and policy research. As part of its research 
and  publications  programme,  the  Employment  Sector  promotes  knowledge-generation 
around  key  policy  issues  and  topics  conforming  to  the  core  elements  of  the  Global 
Employment Agenda and the Decent Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of 
books, monographs, working papers, employment reports and policy briefs.
4 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main findings 
of  research  initiatives  undertaken  by  the  various  departments  and  programmes  of  the 
Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange of ideas and to stimulate 
debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the ILO. 
   
 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf 
2 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour Conference: Decent 
work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (2001); Working out of poverty 
(2003). 
3 See  http://www.ilo.org/gea.  And  in  particular:  Implementing  the  Global  Employment  Agenda: 
Employment strategies in support of decent work, “Vision” document, ILO, 2006. 
4 See http://www.ilo.org/employment. 
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Foreword 
This  paper  examines  the  association  between  growth  and  poverty  reduction  and 
argues that is not as strong an empirical relationship as it is generally expected to be in 
development policy making. It also shows that to expect growth not to have any systematic 
positive  association  with  income  inequality  in  developing  countries  is  misplaced.  It  is 
argued that we ought to expect that, in general, growth is more likely to weakly reduce 
poverty and a little more strongly increase income inequality. With this more realistic 
perspective on the associations between economic growth, income inequality and absolute 
poverty, the paper goes on to examine whether the speed at which developing economies 
have globalised, has influenced the intensity with which growth impacted poverty and 
inequality respectively? It is shown that amongst the fastest globalisers, growth on average 
increased inequality significantly and was not associated with poverty reduction. On the 
other hand, for developing economies that globalised at a relatively slower pace, growth 
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This paper argues that the association between growth and poverty reduction is not as 
strong an empirical relationship as it is often expected to be in development policy making. 
We argue that the measure of growth that is typically used in establishing the strong inverse 
relation between growth and poverty is not very suitable for measuring economic growth. 
When the appropriate indicator, i.e. change in GDP per capita, is used as a measure of 
growth (instead of change in the mean expenditure/ income from the household survey) the 
results pertaining to the “inverse relation” become very weak. We also argue that to expect 
growth not to have any systematic positive association with income inequality (as in the 
first half of the Kuznet's curve
5) in developing countries is also misplaced; and the view 
that growth does not systematically increase inequality in developing countries, is also a 
consequence of using the same unsuitable indicator of economic growth, namely the change 
in survey mean expenditure/income. The paper also shows that when we use the correct 
indicator  of  economic  growth,  we  ought  to  expect  that  in  general,  growth  would  very 
weakly reduce poverty and a little more strongly increase income inequality – instead of 
expecting it to strongly reduce poverty and be indifferent to changes in inequality. With this 
more realistic perspective on the associations between economic growth, income inequality 
and absolute poverty, the paper goes on to examine whether the speed at which developing 
economies  have  globalised,  through  enhanced  trade  and  FDI  flows,  has  influenced  the 
intensity with which growth impacted poverty and inequality respectively. We find that 
amongst the fastest globalisers, growth on average increased inequality significantly and 
was not associated with poverty reduction. On the other hand, for developing economies 
that globalised at a relatively slower pace, growth reduced poverty and was not associated 
with rising inequality.  
The  rapid  reduction  and  elimination  of  absolute  poverty  is  one  central  of  aim  of 
development.  Development  policies  that  are  supposed  to  achieve  this  aim  are  twofold: 
growth policies and distribution policies respectively. While the importance of the type and 
combination  of  growth  and  distribution  policies  is  country  and  situation  specific,  such 
policies are also seriously influenced by the general expectations that one forms on the 
interrelationships between poverty, growth and inequality. These general expectations are 
based on taking an overview of the historical experience of countries with regards to these 
relationships. It is these general expectations that are explored in the present paper. 
It is useful to illustrate by example what these general expectations are and how they 
are formed. If we assume that, on average, growth strongly and unambiguously tends to 
reduce poverty, and that inequality does not show any systematic pattern of increase with 
growth- then the type of policy questions explored as a consequence of these positions will 
be of a particular variety. In particular, the search for patterns of growth that reduce poverty 
more would become of secondary importance – because it would be taken for granted that 
overall growth always reduces some poverty. Second, the consequences of inequality rising 
with economic growth would not be entertained as an empirical likelihood and thus policies 
designed to contain inequalities would not be developed with any urgency. In fact, this is 
what the dominant general policy view has been during the last two decades; namely that 
 
 
5 See Kuznets (1955) where the argument was first developed. The rise in inequality at lower levels 
of development is related to incentive based arguments for investment by owners of capital proposed 
by Kuznets. Therefore unlike the growth-poverty inverse relation that has no theoretical basis, the 
inequality-growth  positive  relation  has  a  conceptual  basis.  Consequently  in  order  to  accept  the 
former, the empirical relation has to be quite strong.   2 
growth per se reduces poverty and that it does not systematically increase inequality. In our 
view these positions need to be seriously reformulated on the basis of evidence. 
Alternatively – and in contrast to the expectations outlined above – if our general 
assessment were to suggest that, on average, in the developing world, poverty reduction 
from  growth  had  been  highly  contingent,  and  that  income  inequality  had  shown  a 
systematic tendency to increase with growth – then this would imply an entirely different 
emphasis in the policy research agenda than the one we have hitherto witnessed.  The focus, 
in such an imagined context, would not only be on growth paths and specific conditions 
that would be expected to encourage poverty reduction; but also on assessing growth paths 
that would exacerbate inequalities less. This is in fact the view that we shall come to take in 
this paper. 
We  shall  examine  some  key  empirical  relationships  that  have  obtained  between 
poverty,  inequality  and  growth  during  the  last  two  decades  of  globalisation  in  the 
developing world. As noted, the central purpose of this exercise is to identify valid general 
associations that set the terrain in which policy discussions are conducted and where more 
specific hypotheses are formulated. The reason why we think this is important to do is 
because  in  the  case  of  poverty,  inequality  and  growth,  it  is  precisely  these  broad 
associations that may not have been what one may have thought them to be until recently.  
 
The data set  
Observations  on  absolute  poverty  rates  that  exist  for  developing  countries  are 
collected unevenly in terms of periodicity and are also limited in number for any particular 
country. Thus there is little possibility of a longer run time series country analysis. In the 
present  exercise  we  use  episodic  data  (on  change)  in  order  to  find  grounds  for  the 
“generalisations” that can be considered valid. It is obvious that for such an exercise we 
need a data base that covers indicators that are of interest; namely on poverty, growth and 
inequality.  
We assume that the absolute poverty estimates made available through the World 
Bank’s PovcalNet
6 are comparable and useable for cross-sectional work and that problems 
associated with comparability and the determination of poverty lines across countries can 
be abstracted from. This is not an inconsiderable assumption, given recent debates on the 
subject
7, and it is made not to undervalue the importance of debates, our point of departure 
is that despite technical problems associated with the construction of poverty lines, we 
currently have no choice but to use these numbers. Without these there can, at present, be 
no empirical assessment on poverty rates. Of course, if the data are all unreliable then the 
analysis will follow their suit, but we assume that this is not the case. We are also not 
concerned with the generation of global and regional estimates in this paper




7 See for example Ravallion (2010), Reddy and Pogge (2002),  Deaton  (2001), Karshenas (2010). 
8 See for example,  Karshenas ( 2010). The range of latest global poverty estimates can vary from 
322 million to 1.5 billion depending on the “type” of poverty estimate being used (Anand et al. 
2010).  There  are  differences  of  opinion  regarding  the  appropriate  estimate  type.    The  trend  in 
poverty is one of decline in the world, but progress on this goal it is spread unevenly across the 
world. These estimates are also based on individual country poverty estimates but apart from having 
 
 3 
leaves internal survey based issues that we need to consider with respect to the variables of 
interest.  
 
Poverty and Inequality estimates 
Household surveys are the basis of estimates of inequality and poverty rates. It is well 
known  that  with  richer  households,  problems  of  truth  telling  obtain  with  respect  to 
reporting income and expenditure. This leads to biases. Such biases emanating from the 
richer respondent sub samples can result in downward estimations of both the mean of 
income/expenditure and of measures of distributional inequality generated from household 
surveys.  Thankfully,  this  particular  problem  does  not  affect  estimates  of  the  absolute 
poverty headcount rate. The degree of these biases can vary across surveys undertaken in 
different countries, as well as at different points of time in any given country.  In short, 
when using survey data while we do not need to worry about poverty headcount estimates, 
we ought to be aware of the biases in inequality and survey mean income/expenditure 
estimates. Unfortunately, because the only appropriate source of measuring inequality is the 
household survey, little can be done about it on this count, except perhaps to arbitrarily 
adjust the inequality indicator upwards, and that procedure, if adopted, must entail its own 
problems.  So  this  problem  is  often  carried  over  in  any  analysis  that  uses  inequality 
estimates
9. This is of course not only true for our analysis but any analysis that uses survey 
based distribution measures. 
In addition to problems associated with forming an international poverty line itself, the 
estimates of incidence of poverty suffer from a number of weaknesses from the point of 
view of use. One is that the survey method may not be uniform across countries. This 
clearly makes cross-country comparisons subject to objections, but not much can be done 
about it. Another problem arises from the fact that the estimates are derived from household 
surveys for some countries and from income surveys for others. Once again for this reason 
cross-country comparisons of levels of poverty can become problematic
10. While little can 
be  done  to  resolve  differences  in  survey  methods,  the  use  of  episodes  reduces  these 
problems to a degree. In any particular country, the time-trend given by household survey-
based estimates ought not to be radically different from that given by income-survey-based 
estimates.  Time trends should ideally be observed over a reasonably long period; yet, for 
some countries, data are available only for two periods with a short interval in between. 
Something can be done to reduce this problem but not to eliminate it
11.This problem is 
 
 
problems  associated  with  individual  country  estimates,  they  additionally  entail  aggregation  and 
predicting missing value problems. The country estimates of poverty have produced considerable 
discussion and this includes technical areas of research concerning the choice of the international 
poverty line, the method of its updating, and the consistency of this method of updating over time. 
9 Using change data overcomes this problem to some degree, i.e. if we assume the bias to be constant 
in a country over time.  
10  Thus, with the same poverty line, we are likely to get different estimates of poverty incidence for 
any given country depending on whether we use the data on consumption distribution or the data on 
income distribution 
11 Given that the available survey-based estimates are for discrete time-periods, time-trends at the 
country level can only be observed by comparing the estimates for initial and terminal periods, 
which happen to be different for different countries. The issue here is that while a comparison of 
initial and terminal values will mostly show some trend, the actual incidence for each year in the 
period (for which we do not have observations) can take the form of a trendless fluctuation. It is 
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especially acute when we test expectations on inequality and growth, which would require 
longer periods to be properly tested.  
We minimize the chances of error by (1) leaving out the cases where the gap between 
the initial and terminal periods is less than 4 years, (2) choosing, wherever data for more 
than two periods are available, initial and terminal periods in such a way as to minimize the 
possibility of deriving misleading trends, (3) choosing a single time-period or “spell” for 
each  country  even though  multiple “spells”  could have  been  chosen  for  some,  and  (4) 
leaving out the cases in which the incidence has been and remains very low (2 per cent or 
less). The resulting sample of is of 69 countries
12. Of these the core developing economies 
have 58 episodes. The analysis is based on these samples. 
 
Estimates of growth 
As far as growth is concerned, it is important to be absolutely clear about the choice of 
indicator, and this is where the central problem lies. This issue is quite independent of the 
aforementioned bias in the mean of incomes or expenditures from a survey. The central 
point to be made in this regard is that when growth is referred to in any applied economics 
literature in the absence of qualifications it is always understood to represent change in 
GDP  or  GDP  per  capita.  A  country’s  growth  is  associated  with  the  expansion  of  her 
national income or output. This is generally and always case.   Therefore the use of change 
in a mean from a survey when it is used as a growth proxy should be explicitly (and 
perhaps repeatedly) acknowledged for what it actually represents, as opposed to what it is 
supposed  to  proxy  for
13.  Secondly,  the  observed  change  in  a  survey-based  mean  of 
income/expenditure  can  be  quite  different  from  even  the  observed  change  in  private 
consumption expenditure (personal disposable income) per capita which is the equivalent 
category  derived  from  national  accounts  statistics
14.    Third,  a  change  in  private 
consumption expenditure (personal disposable income) per capita that is based on national 
accounts can itself be quite different from change in per capita GDP from the same national 




therefore entirely possible that the trend would have been quite different from what we observe, not 
only if we had different initial and terminal dates for an episode, but also if we knew what the 
missing values between the two points actually were.  
12 China, India and Indonesia have been split in to rural and urban in the PovcalNet dataset. We have 
combined them with population weights to create all country indicators of change in the survey 
mean, poverty headcount ratio and the gini coefficient. Treating rural and urban China, India and 
Indonesia  as  separate  countries  thereby  increasing  the  observations  makes  no  difference  to  the 
results. 
13  See Ravallion (2001a) discussion on national accounts and survey means.  Most of the estimates 
that  show a  generally strong growth-poverty (absolute) inverse relation, including the numerous 
works on poverty by Ravallion himself, are based on survey means. Bourguignon (2003) also uses 
the survey mean but his purpose is to explore the analytics of poverty, inequality and growth. 
14 Private consumption is one element in GDP. 
15 In a few of the least developed countries, mean income/expenditure  derived from surveys is found 
to be higher than private consumption expenditure (personal disposable income) per capita derived 
from national accounts data (see UNCTAD, 2002). In these countries, it seems, it is the poorer 
households  that  tend  to  be  under-represented  in  household  surveys.  In  such  cases,  there  is  an 
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The most important issue from a growth perspective is not so much about preserving the 
sanctity of the empirical universe (the household survey) from which data are drawn to 
show  links  between  “growth”,  inequality  and  poverty;  but  rather  it  is  about  whether 
“growth”  that  is  captured  by  the  change  in  the  mean  of  income/expenditure  from  a 
household survey is in fact the “growth” we are interested in, in the first place?  
Our view is that a change in the survey-based mean is a poor indicator of economic 
growth; and that in exploring the growth-poverty link we are interested not in the former 
but  an  indicator  based  on  per  capita  national  income.  Thus  an  observed  (inverse) 
relationship  between  change  in  the  poverty  incidence  and  change  in  (survey-based 
estimates of) mean income; or ( the lack of one) between change in survey-based mean 
income and change in income inequality - do not in fact constitute a reasonable basis for 
claiming that in general or on average “economic growth” was either poverty-reducing or 
distribution-neutral. At best, such results, if found, tell us that a rise in a household survey’s 
mean  income/expenditure    during  selected  episodes  across  countries  was  associated 
negatively  with  changes  in  the  poverty  rate  and  was  not  associated  with  changes  in 
inequality. The central point is that using survey means as a proxy for “economic growth”, 
especially when the difference between growth in GDP per capita and the change in survey 
mean is not addressed can be misleading.   
The growth of national income and the growth 
of survey means  
GDP per capita with all its faults as an indicator is after all the accepted indicator of 
growth in most applied economics research
16. It is clearly not unreasonable to take the view 
that the burden of providing rationales for preferring the mean of income or expenditure 
from a survey as a superior measure of “growth” to change in GDP per capita, ought to be 
on analysis that reveals such a preference.   
 The mean income in a household survey on the other hand, only reflects the average 
income of the households covered in the survey. The change in this indicator is indeed the 
change in the indicator of “average welfare”
17. Unlike the change in GDP per capita, the 
change in mean expenditure/income from a household survey is not a good indicator of 
economic growth in a country.  The question as to why there are likely to be differences 
between  these  two  indicators in terms  of  coverage of  categories  of  output and  income 
included in calculation is a separate one from what these indicators best represent.  In our 
view  change  in  GDP  per  capita  is  an  established  indicator  of  economic  growth  or 
expansion, while change in the mean income/expenditure from a survey is not an economy 
wide growth indicator, but an average welfare indicator.  Therefore these categories are not 
substitutive in terms of what they represent. 
 
 
underestimation, not just of distributional inequality, but also of poverty incidence. On the other 
hand, there is serious overestimation of average consumption/income. 
16 It needs to be kept in mind that problems with the GDP indicator as such are mostly with its 
welfare implications and not with its growth aspects. 
17  When  the  GDP  indicator  is  normalised  by  the  population  estimate  of  a  country,  it  is  still  an 
indicator of growth; namely the change in “GDP” per capita. The fact that this normalisation to 
population  ostensibly  also  makes  the  indicator  some  sort  of    proxy  of  “average”  welfare  in  an 
economy- i.e. the national income per head- has little to do with its appropriateness as an indicator of 
economic  growth. 6 
The graph below Figure 1 shows this issue quite clearly. From our sample of episodes, 
we plot the change in GDP per capita on the x axis, and the change in mean expenditure 
from the household survey on the y axis. It is quite obvious that there is no systematic 
relationship. In other words, changes in average incomes have not systematically followed 
changes in GDP per capita.  This means that whatever relationships obtain between poverty 
inequality and growth these are unlikely to be similar between the respective “growth” 
proxies.   
 




Note: The equation is y=0.235x + 0.012; R² = 0.024; N = 69. The growth measure is the 
compound annual growth rate for all illustrations in this paper. In all following figures *** 
and ** indicate 1% and 5% significance levels. 
 
Results using the change in the survey mean as 
an indicator of growth 
Before  we  proceed  with  illustrations,  some  clarifications  are  needed.  There  are  two 
varieties  of  empirical  illustrations  that  need  to  be  distinguished  for  our  purposes;  the 
analytical and the historical. For example, in the former it can be asked whether or not 
growth reduces poverty in the developing world in an analytical sense, i.e. by holding 
change  in  inequality  constant  in  the  poverty-growth-inequality  identity.  In  this  type  of 
illustration, there is often an attempt to explore expectations on the “pure effects” of growth 
and of changes in inequality respectively on changes in poverty.   It is in such exercises that 
we can also get an empirical decomposition of the change in the absolute poverty rate into a 
“growth effect” and “distribution effect”
18. It is important to make the basic point that  such 
an exercise tell us nothing about what has  happened to poverty in the growth process. In an 
historical illustration, on the other hand, we are interested in the signs and significance of 
coefficients  in  bi-variate  relationships  i.e.  between  two  change  variables.  These 
 
 
18 See Annex for such an illustration with the present data set.  A precise characterization of this 
identity  is  given  in  Bourguignon  (2003).  While  it  is  the  case  that  we  can  learn  a  lot  from  the 
examination of changes in poverty,  inequality and the mean income drawn from the same universe 
(i.e. the survey), it is a separate matter whether that learning has any implication for considering the 





































GDP per capita growth PPP7 
relationships clearly do not tell us how one variable was analytically associated with the 
other, or whether the change in one was instrumental in causing the other to alter, rather 
these simply, but importantly, show that the “observed” association between two variables 
in the episodes across countries, given all the interdependencies, was of a certain sign and 
statistical significance. This is of course important in itself, because it is precisely what 
informs the aforementioned general expectations within which hypotheses are set up for 
more  detailed  empirical    work,  typically  at  a  country  level.    We  first  examine  the 
relationships using the change in the survey mean as a proxy for growth. This as we have 
suggested  above  is  not  a  good  indicator  of  economic  growth  and  is  better  seen  as  an 
indicator  of  expenditure  (or  income)  based  average  welfare  in  the  household  survey. 
Figure 1 shows the cross-country relationship between change in poverty incidence and 
change  in  survey  mean  expenditure/income  from  the  survey.  This  is  a  reasonable 
relationship, bearing in mind that we are looking at change variables
19. 
 








19 Typically the relationship between two change variables is found to be much weaker than the same 
variables measured on a level basis. This means that a test based on change variables is much more 
demanding. An inverse relationship between growth and change in poverty means that faster growth 
leads to a faster poverty reduction. One line of reasoning from this that can be developed is to 
examine the elasticity of this change relationship. If the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth 
is very high then growth would be considered sufficient for poverty reduction. If it is low then 
redistribution  (or  other  factors)  would  matter  more.    Ravallion  and  Chen  (1997)  estimated  the 
elasticity number of 3. The increase in mean income or consumption by 1 per cent reduces the 
proportion persons living under poverty by 3 per cent.  Our elasticity equivalent in Figure 2 is 1.2  
per cent. It is much lower. Bourguignon (2003) makes the generally overlooked point that if R-
Squared values are taken to represent the proportion of explained variance of observed changes in 
poverty headcounts,- as they ought to-  then the values of this statistic are in themselves so low (.26 
in his sample; .36 in ours) so as to make us worry more about the unexplained variation first, and this 
is almost always high enough for one not to rely on growth strategies as a main policy instrument to 







































Growth in the mean of survey8 
 
Figure 3 shows the cross-country relationship between change in the Gini coefficient 
of income distribution and the change in survey mean expenditure/income from the survey 
for the same set of countries.  
 
 




Note: The equation is y = 0.098x - 0.005; R² = 0.046; N = 69.  
 
When we look at how inequality moved during these growth episodes, we find that not 
only is the fit very poor in Figure 2, but the coefficient on the growth variable is not 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. Overall, Figures 1 and 2, taken together 
suggest that change in poverty has been significantly and inversely related to growth during 
the episodes; and the change in inequality has not been associated with growth. The general 
relationship between “growth” – as it is measured by the change in the survey mean – on 
the one hand, and changes in poverty and inequality respectively on the other, are according 
the dominant policy view.  From these illustrations, it would be valid to say that in general 
growth systematically reduced poverty but did nothing systematic to change inequality in 
the preceding decades of globalisation in the developing world- the period from which our 
sample is drawn. 
Results using the change in GDP per capita as 
an indicator of growth 
We now use growth in GDP per capita as the growth proxy – the indicator which in 
our view reflects better what is normally understood by growth – for the same episodes. 
There  are  some  interesting  changes  that  occur.  Figure  4  shows  the  cross-country 
relationship between change in poverty incidence and change in GDP per capita PPP for the 
same periods and countries. 








































Growth in the mean of surveyFigure 4. An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) is weakly but significantly related to the decline in poverty 
during the episodes 
Note: The equation is y = -
Compared to Figure 2, 
growth variable is still significant and negative, it is much weaker and the general fit is now 
very poor.  Purely on grounds of it being an empirical relation, with no strong theoretical 
reasons  to  expect  it,  this  is  a  weak  association  and 
relationship shown in Figure 2 above. And that is the crucial point. If we use the more 
appropriate indicator of growth, we must lose faith in the strength of this association. Using 
change in GDP per capita as a proxy for
contingent on other factors.   
Figure 5 shows
and change in GDP per capita PPP. While this fit is also weak one, the coefficient on the 
indicator capturing the change in inequality 
Figure 5 must be seen in contrast to Figure 3 where there was no systematic relationship 
found between the change in the mean of survey and the change in the Gini coef
 
Figure 5.  An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) weakly but significantly increased inequality during the 
episodes 
Note: The equation is y = 0.152
 






































GDP per capita growth PPP
9 
An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) is weakly but significantly related to the decline in poverty 
during the episodes  
 
-0.741**x-0.014; R² = 0.062; N= 69. 
Compared to Figure 2, while the relationship is an inverse one, and the 
growth variable is still significant and negative, it is much weaker and the general fit is now 
very poor.  Purely on grounds of it being an empirical relation, with no strong theoretical 
reasons  to  expect  it,  this  is  a  weak  association  and  stands  in  glaring  contrast  to  the 
relationship shown in Figure 2 above. And that is the crucial point. If we use the more 
appropriate indicator of growth, we must lose faith in the strength of this association. Using 
change in GDP per capita as a proxy for growth makes poverty reduction much more 
contingent on other factors.    
shows the cross-country relationship between change in the Gini coefficient 
and change in GDP per capita PPP. While this fit is also weak one, the coefficient on the 
or capturing the change in inequality – i.e. the Gini – is now positive and significant. 
Figure 5 must be seen in contrast to Figure 3 where there was no systematic relationship 
found between the change in the mean of survey and the change in the Gini coef
An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) weakly but significantly increased inequality during the 
 
= 0.152*x - 0.007; R² = 0.050; N = 69. 
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GDP per capita growth PPP
An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) is weakly but significantly related to the decline in poverty 
hile the relationship is an inverse one, and the coefficient on 
growth variable is still significant and negative, it is much weaker and the general fit is now 
very poor.  Purely on grounds of it being an empirical relation, with no strong theoretical 
stands  in  glaring  contrast  to  the 
relationship shown in Figure 2 above. And that is the crucial point. If we use the more 
appropriate indicator of growth, we must lose faith in the strength of this association. Using 
growth makes poverty reduction much more 
country relationship between change in the Gini coefficient 
and change in GDP per capita PPP. While this fit is also weak one, the coefficient on the 
is now positive and significant. 
Figure 5 must be seen in contrast to Figure 3 where there was no systematic relationship 
found between the change in the mean of survey and the change in the Gini coefficient.  
An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) weakly but significantly increased inequality during the 10 
Thus using the change in GDP per capita proxy for growth, not only shows a weak, 
albeit significant, inverse relationship between economic growth and poverty change but 
also a weak but significant and  positive relationship between change in inequality and 
growth. In short, taking the change in GDP per capita as a proxy for growth, we can expect 
both poverty to decline and inequality to weakly rise with growth. These illustrations put a 
sobering  perspective  on  the  so  called  general  inverse  relationship  between  growth  and 
poverty.  It is obvious that the popular policy view is really influenced by the results that 
emerge from using the less appropriate proxy for economic growth, namely the change in 
the survey mean
20. 
The  historical  relationships  observed  above  suggest  some  reorientation  in  basic 
assessments.  If  we  assume  that  our  procedure  of  selecting  episodes  is  independently 
meaningful, then the main differences in our simple associative tests are attributable to our 
choice of the growth indicator. The experience of the developing world in the episodes 
examined  above,  suggests  a  few  things.  First that amongst  the  growth proxies  used  in 
poverty analysis we should at least also always use GDP or GDP per capita- indicators that 
researchers working on economic growth recognise as growth. The change in the mean 
from a household survey may well be a better indicator of “average welfare”, but it is not a 
good indicator of economic growth. The terminological ambiguity in calling both indicators 
“growth” may seem innocuous, but this has been seriously misleading at least for the policy 
maker. Second, using the GDP per capita indicator we need to be much more circumspect 
about our expectations on the impact of economic growth on poverty reduction and a little 
more alert to the possibility of income inequality rising with growth.  In short the practice 
of using these two indicators, as if they were interchangeable or stood for the same category 
is dubious.   
Our episodes of 69 countries include transition economies and petroleum exporting 
developing economies. It can be argued that a better picture is likely to emerge if we took 
the sample of more typical developing economies. If we reduce the sample by countries 
from these two sub-groups, we get a sample of “core” developing countries
21. In this core 
developing country sample the coefficients and the fits become stronger especially with 
respect to the inequality and growth results. 
   
 
 
20 See Fields (1989); Ravallion (1995, 2001a); Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998); Dollar and Kraay 
(2001a); and Chen and Ravallion (2004). It is worth noting, however, that one study – Lundberg and 
Squire (2003) – found a tendency for economic growth to be associated with rising inequality. 
21 See Ghose, Majid and Ernst (2008) for a fuller discussion on a similar categorization. We take the 
developing economies characterization of the World Bank from WDI and exclude two categories 
from it. The first are those countries 50 per cent or more of whose export earnings are based on 
petroleum related products.   The second group is of countries that have per capita incomes of 
US$10,000 or more in 2003,  who are not considered developed and are not major exporters of 
petroleum. Essentially core developing countries exclude petroleum exporting developing countries, 
small high income developing countries. 11 
Figure 6.   An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) weakly but significantly reduced poverty for core 
developing country episodes  
 
Note: The equation is y = -1.034**x – 0.01; R² = 0.10; N = 58. 
 
Figure 7.   An increase in GDP per capita (PPP) significantly increased inequality for core developing 
country episodes 
 
Note: The equation is y = 0.247**x - 0.007; R² = 0.111; N=58. 
 
There is an improvement in the growth poverty reduction inverse relation compared to 
the full sample of 69 economies just as there is a strengthening of the positive relation 
between inequality change  and growth (Figures 4 and 5) but the fit is still poor.  In fact 
data on income inequality from WIDER show fairly clearly that Gini coefficients of income 
distribution have risen with GDP per capita in developing countries. This is an independent 
corroboration  of  the  general  tendency  of  income  inequality  to  rise  with  growth  in 
developing countries. 
 










































































GDP per capita growth PPP12 
Table 1.  Income inequality and national income are in general positively related for core developing 
economies- panel regression results 






GDP per capita PPP (000s)  .934  .018  .009 
  (.232)***  (.029)  (.040) 
Observations  381  410  1185 
R-squared  .221  .008  .202 
Note: Dependent variable is GINI (GINI measure using pooled observations of consumption, gross earnings, gross income and net 
income. The type of GINI does not vary within country). *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis.  Both specifications use a panel data time series model with fixed effects. Column 1 shows results for Core 
developing countries. Column 2 shows results for developed countries.  The results using a balanced panel with predicted values of 
the Gini give similar results. 
Number of countries per group: Core developing: 71, Developed: 23 
Source: GINI measures come from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database 
(http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/wiid/). GDP per capita values are taken from the World Bank World 




The speed of globalisation and the historical 
association between growth and poverty; 
and growth and inequality  
In previous sections, we found that the overall economic growth and poverty reduction 
relationship to be a weak one, and the one between growth and rising inequality a relatively 
stronger one than what is popularly believed.  Can we say something in this context about 
the  globalisation  experience  of  the  developing  world?    We  focus  on  core  developing 
economies. 
While results on the relationship between indicators of globalisation and growth have 
been subject to debate, if a general view can be formed it is one that suggests that trade 
flows in the developing world have either been good for growth or at least have not been 
bad for growth. The impression with regards to FDI and growth is even less conclusive. It 
needs to be stated that, if a positive relationship between growth and trade is taken to be 
generally  valid,  then  the  aforementioned  growth  poverty-reduction  framework  (which 
suggests that growth is unambiguously good for poverty reduction and is not systematically 
related increasing inequality) comes in to play.    
The aim of this section is to examine if we can say anything about what may have 
happened to the associations between economic growth on the one hand; and poverty and 
inequality,  respectively,  on  the  other.  We  split  our  sample  between  fast  and  slow 
globalisers. Our proxies of globalisation are the annualised growth rates in TRADE /GDP 
ratios and in FDI/GDP ratios. For this purpose we rank country episodes in a descending 
order according to the annualized growth in the TRADE/GDP ratio. Then we simply divide 
our sample between a top half that shows relatively higher growth in the TRADE/GDP 
ratio and a bottom half with comparatively lower growth in TRADE/GDP ratios. Similarly 13 
we split the sample in to a top and a bottom half with respect to growth in FDI /GDP 
ratios
22.  
In needs to be noted that we also need to examine the relationship between growth and 
the  two  standard  indicators  of  globalisation  in  our  unsplit  sample  of  core  developing 
country episodes. This exercise is done in Annex 3. Economic growth was found to be 
positively  associated  with  increased  trade  openness  (TRADE/GDP  ratios)  but  not  with 
increased FDI flows (FDI/GDP ratios) during these episodes. 
The pace of trade openness and the poverty-
inequality-growth linkage 
The speed at which economies opened up to trade when captured by the change in the 
TRADE /GDP ratio reflects realised openness. It is important to bear in mind that this does 
not necessarily tell us anything about liberalisation policy. It is quite clear from Figure 11 
that on average in our sample of countries with high trade growth, economic growth was 
not systematically associated with poverty reduction. 
Figure 11: There is no systematic relationship between and growth and poverty reduction in countries with 
high speed trade openness (Top 28) 
 
 
Note: The equation is y = -0.646x - 0.021; R² = 0.0797; N=28. 
This is interesting because it implies that if growth did take place in this sub-sample 
on account of trade openness, as was the case here, it was not the kind of growth that shows 
 
 
22 The advantage of an episode based change data set is that we can put sample splitting controls on it 
to examine globalisation effects. It is important to be clear on the question that is not being asked 
here. We are not examining what the direct effect of changes in FDI or trade is on poverty reduction 
and inequality changes; or asking how these globalisation capturing variables instrumentally impinge 
on growth.  The question posed here is whether in countries with a higher velocity of exposure to 
trade and FDI, the two basic associations between growth and poverty reduction; and growth and 









































GDP per capita growth PPP14 
up in an inverse growth-poverty relationship
23. This is of course not to say that poverty may 
not  have  declined  in  these  economies  either  before  their  opening  up  or  via  other 
redistributive mechanisms with varying lags. However, growth amongst economies that 
opened up to trade with speed was not associated with poverty reduction
24.  
The  obvious  reason  for  the  absence  of  a  linkage  between  growth  and  poverty 
reduction is likely to be that inequality may have been systematically associated with the 
growth process amongst this high speed trading group. Figure 12 shows exactly that. 
 
 Figure 12.  Growth in inequality is positively associated with economic growth in countries that opened up 
to trade at high speed (Top 28) 
 
Note: The equation is y = 0.242**x - 0.005; R2 = 0.148; N=28. 
 
Inequality was clearly related positively to growth in the top 28 traders in our sample 
of episodes.  On the other hand, in countries that increased  TRADE/GDP ratios at a lower 
speed- that is countries in the bottom group of trade growth- it is interesting that the results 
are the opposite. Figure 13 shows us that on average, the inverse growth poverty reduction 
relationship is obtained in these economies, and Figure 14 shows that in this group changes 
in inequality were not systematically associated with economic growth.   
 
   
 
 
23 This of course raises the question of the type of growth that is friendly to poverty reduction. This 
issue is explored in a sector specific context in Majid (2004), and more generally in a dual economy 
framework in GEC (2008).  
24  See  Ghose  (2003)  for  an  overall  assessment  of  the  way  economic  globalisation  impacted 
developing economies during the 1980s and 1990s. It is quite clear that the trade based component is 
essentially  one  of  increased  exports  of  manufactured  goods  from  a  few  large  and  important 
developing economies. This means that increased trade dominantly impacted organized parts of the 








































GDP per capita growth PPP15 




Note: The equation is y = -2.118***x + 0.009; R2 = 0.191; N = 29. 
 
Figure 14.  Growth and inequality change are not systematically related in countries with a lower speed 
trade growth (Bottom 29)  
 
 
Note: The equation is y = 0.237x - 0.008; R2 = 0.056; N = 29. 
 
In short, while high speed trade openness did enhance growth, it produced economic 
growth that seems to have done little for poverty reduction and which has been associated 
with exacerbating inequalities. On the other hand, the more moderately opening economies 
with respect to trade showed the expected inverse growth-poverty relationship and did not 
seem  to  have  experienced  growth  that  systematically  increased  inequality.  In  fact  and 
curiously the policy view which holds that growth generally reduces poverty and does not 
systematically increase inequality – fits better with the experience of those countries whose 
pace of trade-led opening was relatively slow rather than fast.  
 




































































GDP per capita growth PPP16 
The pace of FDI openness and the poverty-
inequality-growth linkage 
We can now look at FDI flows as we have done with trade in the previous section. The 
point to bear in mind here is that in our un-split sample, (discussed in Annex 2), unlike 
trade openness and growth, we cannot find any link between the speed of FDI flows and 
economic growth.  The general relationship that is found to be valid for trade openness and 
growth is not valid for FDI inflows and growth. We first look at the countries with the high 
speed increase in FDI/GDP ratios. 
 
Figure 15.  There is no systematic relationship between and growth and poverty reduction in countries with 
high speed FDI/GDP growth (Top 27) 
 
 
Note: The equation is y = - 0.464x - 0.019; R2 = 0.052; N = 27. 
 
Figure 16.  Growth and inequality change are positively related in countries with high speed capital 
openness (FDI/GDP growth) (Top 27) 
 
 
Note: The equation is y = 0.295**x – 0.008; R2 = 0.17; N=27. 
 
Figures 15 and 16 show that in economies which experienced high speed FDI flows, 
poverty and economic growth were not inversely related; and growth and inequality were 
positively related. These associations suggest that, on average, high speed FDI inflows are 
either adverse or neutral and generally not beneficial for welfare. The story of countries 
experiencing a relatively slow pace in FDI/GDP growth is shown in Figures 17 and 18. In 



































































GDP per capita growth PPP17 
obtains; and importantly no positive association between growth and inequality change can 
be  established.  So  countries  opening  more  slowly  to  FDI  did  well  on  our  welfarist 
associations. 
   




Note: The equation is y = - 1.555**x - 0.009; R2 = 0.1711; N = 27. 
 
 
Figure 18. Growth and inequality change are not systematically related in countries with lower speed FDI 





Note: The equation is y= 0.16x – 0.006; R2 = 0.065; N = 27 
 









































































GDP per capita growth PPP18 
Conclusion 
The  analytical  framework  in  which  we  can  understand  the  process  of  poverty 
reduction  is  not  a  controversial  one,  where  economic  growth  reduces  poverty  when 
inequality is held constant; and rising inequality increases poverty when growth is held 
constant. It is important not to associate these results with how we ascertain the actual 
experience of poverty reduction and growth in developing countries in the recent decades. 
The historical experience of developing countries with respect to the so called growth-
poverty reduction relationship has been a weak one. It is unfortunate that an implausible 
indicator  of  economic  growth  has  often  been  used  to  bolster  a  growth-poverty  inverse 
relation that has in fact been much weaker; and to show the absence of a positive relation 
between inequality and economic growth where one may have been warranted.  Using a 
more plausible measure of economic growth- the change in GDP per capita- we find that 
the historical association between growth and inequality is a weakly positive one and the 
one between growth and poverty change a weakly negative one.  In the universe of typical 
developing  countries,  which  we  call  core  developing  countries,  the  same  relationships 
persist and become somewhat stronger.  It is important to bear in mind that the question we 
wish to explore is what “economic growth” means, on average, for changes in poverty 
rates? The question is not what increases in average household income imply for poverty 
rates among those households whose income on average is increasing. This is because 
economic growth (change in GDP per capita) is not systematically related to changes in 
household mean income.  
In  the  period  from  which  our  episodes  are  drawn, developing  countries  have  also 
opened up and integrated in to the global economy. They have done so at varying speeds. 
Our observations in the globalisation context are limited to the pace of opening up; and the 
relationship of this pace or speed to the strength of the relationships observed between 
poverty, inequality and growth. While rapidly increasing TRADE/GDP ratios have been 
associated with higher growth, the same cannot be said about rapidly increasing FDI/GDP 
ratios.  It also appears that in countries that have globalised faster in these episodes on each 
of the two counts of opening up- inequality has significantly increased with growth and this 
is perhaps why the experience of developing countries that have opened up fastest, does not 
reveal any systematic growth and poverty inverse link. The converse is also true. It is the 
case that countries that opened up relatively slower than the fast globalisers with respect to 
the  same  indicators  have  on  average  displayed  unambiguous  decreases  in  poverty  and 
shown no systematic rise in inequality with respect to economic growth.  
 In conclusion, We should not expect- and we ought not to have expected in past- that 
rapid and high speed globalisation would be beneficial for reducing poverty in any direct 
sense; just as we should not expect -and ought not to have expected in the past- that growth 
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Annex 1.  Data and episodes 
Table A1.  Annualized compound growth rates of selected variables for core developing countries 
 
Source  :  Data  on  headcount,  Gini  coefficient  and  mean  of  the  survey  come  from  Povcal  (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/ 




rate of the 
headcount
Growth rate of 
the per capita 
GDP PPP
Growth rate 
of the GINI 
coefficient
Growth rate 
of the mean 
of the survey
Growth rate 
of the FDI as 
% of GDP
Growth rate 
of trade as % 
of GDP
Bangladesh Core 1992 - 2005 -0.3320 0.0306 0.0144 0.0095 0.4405 0.0543
Bolivia Core 1991 - 2005 11.9695 0.0125 0.0235 0.0108 0.0230
Brazil Core 1990 - 2007 -6.2084 0.0131 -0.0057 0.0191 0.1581 0.0262
Burkina Faso Core 1994 - 2003 -2.5245 0.0337 -0.0271 0.0155 -0.0383 -0.0275
Burundi Core 1992 - 2006 -0.2517 -0.0294 -0.0001 0.0076 -0.1801 0.0311
Cambodia Core 1994 - 2004 -1.8720 0.0532 0.0090 0.0188 -0.0002 0.0768
Cameroon Core 1996 - 2001 -8.6082 0.0219 -0.0098 0.0596 -0.0601 0.0156
Central African Republic Core 1993 - 2003 -2.7832 -0.0067 -0.0336 0.0519 -0.0188
Chile Core 1990 - 2006 -17.7960 0.0413 -0.0041 0.0257 0.0555 0.0102
China Core 1990 - 2005 -8.3574 0.0913 0.0130 0.0670 0.0772 0.0467
Colombia Core 1995 - 2006 3.2764 0.0094 0.0020 0.0003 0.1321 0.0266
Costa Rica Core 1990 - 2005 -8.6188 0.0249 0.0023 0.0312 0.0461 0.0294
Cote d'Ivoire Core 1993 - 2002 3.0630 -0.0010 0.0305 0.0439 0.0983 0.0466
Djibouti Core 1996 - 2002 25.7706 -0.0177 0.0140 -0.0763 -0.0199 -0.0127
Dominican Republic Core 1992 - 2005 0.6124 0.0343 -0.0021 0.0052 0.0576 0.0087
Ecuador Core 1994 - 2007 -8.9507 0.0162 0.0034 0.0467 -0.1418 0.0220
Egypt, Arab. Rep. Core 1991 - 2005 -5.6014 0.0240 0.0003 0.0078 0.1677 -0.0007
El Salvador Core 1995 - 2005 -1.4382 0.0094 -0.0003 0.0198 0.2229 0.0190
Ethiopia Core 1995 - 2005 -4.2892 0.0253 -0.0290 0.0125 0.2776 0.0712
Gambia, The Core 1998 - 2003 -12.4290 0.0082 -0.0120 0.1452 0.0095 -0.0256
Ghana Core 1992 - 2006 -3.7310 0.0221 0.0082 0.0340 0.2090 0.0604
Guatemala Core 1998 - 2006 -2.6251 0.0098 -0.0045 0.0117 -0.0691 0.0579
Guinea Core 1991 - 2003 -2.2851 0.0126 -0.0070 0.0785 0.0494 -0.0215
Guinea-Bissau Core 1991 - 2002 1.5320 -0.0272 -0.0408 -0.0463 0.0721 0.0505
Honduras Core 1990 - 2006 -5.3035 0.0163 -0.0023 0.0509 0.0957 0.0331
India Core 1994 - 2005 -1.5396 0.0478 0.0067 0.0125 0.0896 0.0697
Indonesia Core 1990 - 2005 -6.0030 0.0292 0.0118 0.0376 0.1090 0.0176
Jordan Core 1992 - 2006 -13.2280 0.0200 -0.0099 0.0135 0.2697 0.0077
Kenya Core 1992 - 2005 -5.0010 0.0004 -0.0143 0.0149 0.0297 0.0149
Lao PDR Core 1992 - 2002 -2.3357 0.0402 0.0070 0.0167 0.0705
Lesotho Core 1993 - 2003 -2.5890 0.0148 -0.0098 0.0150 0.1941 0.0105
Madagascar Core 1993 - 2005 -0.5522 -0.0027 0.0020 0.0177 0.1157 0.0452
Malawi Core 1998 - 2004 -1.9395 -0.0163 -0.0415 0.0245 0.3455 -0.0065
Mali Core 1994 - 2006 -4.2013 0.0279 -0.0214 0.0619 0.0308 0.0078
Mauritania Core 1993 - 2000 -9.5704 -0.0013 -0.0349 0.0320 0.1632 0.0608
Mexico Core 1992 - 2006 -12.8800 0.0153 -0.0042 0.0183 0.0384 0.0442
Mongolia Core 1995 - 2005 1.7638 0.0338 -0.0005 -0.0099 0.2592 0.0315
Morocco Core 1991 - 2007 0.1264 0.0178 0.0026 0.0024 0.0769 0.0198
Mozambique Core 1997 - 2003 -1.4115 0.0507 0.0096 0.0371 0.2704 0.1181
Nepal Core 1996 - 2004 -2.6693 0.0172 0.0289 0.0490 -0.0291
Nicaragua Core 1993 - 2005 -5.8282 0.0242 -0.0062 0.0273 0.0698 0.0212
Niger Core 1992 - 2005 -0.7643 -0.0029 0.0151 0.0144 -0.0451 0.0115
Pakistan Core 1991 - 2005 -7.2416 0.0173 -0.0045 0.0394 0.0943 -0.0006
Panama Core 1991 - 2006 -3.7733 0.0276 -0.0023 0.0173 0.1490 -0.0180
Paraguay Core 1990 - 2007 0.5760 0.0021 0.0174 0.0341 0.0022 0.0297
Philippines Core 1991 - 2006 -2.0113 0.0173 0.0003 0.0136 0.0499 0.0279
Senegal Core 1991 - 2005 -4.7086 0.0097 -0.0228 0.0288 0.0181
South Africa Core 1993 - 2000 1.0813 0.0056 -0.0038 -0.0164 0.8839 0.0393
Sri Lanka Core 1991 - 2002 -0.6636 0.0362 0.0215 0.0250 0.0716 0.0111
Swaziland Core 1995 - 2001 -3.6564 -0.0142 -0.0295 0.0540 -0.0526 0.0209
Tanzania Core 1992 - 2000 2.5110 0.0057 0.0029 -0.0470 0.4477 -0.0287
Thailand Core 1992 - 2004 -19.5600 0.0306 -0.0071 0.0184 0.0557 0.0478
Tunisa Core 1990 - 2000 -7.9995 0.0308 0.0014 0.0189 0.2008 -0.0015
Turkey Core 1994 - 2005 2.3796 0.0299 0.0037 0.0129 0.1448 0.0185
Uganda Core 1992 - 2005 -2.3299 0.0337 0.0000 0.0257 0.3286 0.0154
Vietnam Core 1993 - 2006 -8.0363 0.0613 0.0044 0.0574 -0.0422 0.0651
Yemen, Rep. Core 1992 - 2005 10.9702 0.0158 -0.0035 -0.0473 -1.8617 0.0091
Zambia Core 1993 - 2004 0.1793 -0.0042 -0.0033 0.0022 -0.0322 -0.005120 
Annex 2.  The analytical identity involving 
change in poverty, economic growth and 
change in inequality across developing 
countries 
 
Most tests on poverty change involving both variables of inequality and growth as 
independent variables show that inequality is positively and growth inversely related to 
poverty. It should be noted that generally in simple multivariate regressions, coefficients on 
x-variables are counterfactual in nature. For example, in our case when a third variable 
capturing inequality is introduced in the poverty-growth regressions, we are, for example, 
no longer forming an overview on how the poverty rate moved with economic growth 
during those episodes; but rather we are forming an overview on how poverty would have 
moved with growth, during those episodes, had there been no change in inequality. And we 
can say the same for interpreting the inequality coefficient. In other words, multivariate 
regression coefficients do not tell us anything about how the poverty rate had actually 
moved with growth, on average, during the cross country sample episodes. It should be 
obvious that if we do not allow for change in inequality, then it is highly probable that any 
growth will reduce the poverty rate.  The central point is the obvious one; namely that from 
the policy dictum that growth reduces poverty based on the analytical equation, it does not 
follow that  growth  was  in  any  historical  sense  associated  with  poverty  reduction. That 
matter has to be separately examined.  We report coefficients from various specification 
regressions
25.  The results are unexceptional. The regressions with survey means proxying 
for growth are much stronger. 
   
 
 
25 See the paper by Bourguignon entitled The Growth Elasticity of Poverty Reduction, in Eicher and 
Turnovsky, eds. (2003). 21 
Table A2. Dependent variable: percentage change in poverty headcount during growth spell 
 









Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5) 
Y = percentage change in GDP 
per capita PPP  -1.03**  -1.50***  -1.45  -1.96 
DGini = variation in Gini 
coefficient    1.83***  1.92***  4.12 
Y * poverty line / GDP per capita 
PPP      31.70**  33.29** 
Y * initial Gini coefficient      -0.036  -0.023 
DGini * poverty line / GDP per 
capita PPP        -59.76** 
DGini * initial Gini coefficient        0.004 
Obs  58  58  55  55 
R-squared  0.1  0.27  0.37  0.45 
 









Explanatory variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (5) 
Y = percentage change in mean 
income  -1.25***  -1.26***  -4.45***  -3.35*** 
DGini = variation in Gini 
coefficient    0.98**  1.63***  6.32*** 
Y * poverty line / mean income      1.21***  0.89*** 
Y * initial Gini coefficient      0.046**  0.025 
DGini * poverty line / mean 
income        -2.79*** 
DGini * initial Gini coefficient        -0.055 
Obs  58  58  55  55 
R-squared  0.36  0.41  0.62  0.7 
 
Notes: We take only one growth spell per country using in each case most ancient and most recent observations 
available. The full list of countries and episodes is in the appendix table 1. 
Sources: Povcal database (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povcalSvy.html) (download date 06.2011) 
and  World  Development  Indicators  Database  (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators)                 
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Annex 3.  The relationship between trade 
openness and FDI flows, and growth for 
core country sample episodes  
Does the episodic data we have show that high speed globalisation was associated 
with growth in the developing world? We can see in Figure A3.1 that there exists a positive 
relationship  between  growth  and  changes  in  TRADE/GDP  ratios  for  the  full  core 
developing country sample. It is also clear from Figure A3.2, that a positive relationship 
between growth and the change in net FDI flows as a percentage of GDP does not exist.  
 
Figure A3.1.  Trade Openness is positively associated with economic growth for the sample episodes in 
core developing economies. 
 
Note: The equation is y = 0.413**x + 0.013; R² = 0.088; N = 57. 
 
Figure A3.2.  FDI flows show not systematic relationship with economic growth for sample episodes in core 
developing economies 
 













































































GDP per capita growth PPP23 
Economic growth was associated with increased trade openness (TRADE/GDP ratios) 
but not with increased FDI flows (FDI/GDP ratios) during these episodes. Any form of 
bundling of these two- even it is argued that trade and FDI expansion are connected - under 
the  rubric  of  “globalisation”  is  both  unwarranted  and  misleading
26.  These  results  with 
carefully chosen episodic data, in our view are not implausible in the light of the literature. 
It is our impression that while there is a greater consensus on a positive growth and trade 
openness  linkage,  there  is  less  agreement  on  a  similar  growth  and  FDI  link.    These 
illustrations are just by way of contextualizing the argument in the main text, namely that in 
this sample of poverty, inequality and growth episodes the associations between the growth 







26 The countries that globalised fastest (the top 27) during the episodes the results are the same as the 
overall results. Speedy trade expansion tended to have been associated with enhanced growth, but 
speedy FDI expansion was not associated with growth.   
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